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Abstract  
 With the increasing interconnection of computer networks and sophistication of cyber 
attacks, it is important to understand the dynamics of such situations, especially in regards to 
cyber international relations. The Explorations in Cyber International Relations (ECIR) Data 
Dashboard Project is an initiative to gather worldwide cybersecurity data publicly provided by 
nation-level Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and to provide a set of tools to 
analyze the cybersecurity data. The unique contributions of this paper are: (1) an evaluation of 
the current state of the diverse nation-level CERT cybersecurity data sources, (2) a description of 
the Data Dashboard tool developed and some interesting analyses from using our tool, and (3) a 
summary of some challenges with the CERT data availability and usability uncovered in our 
research. 
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1. Introduction 
 The growing global interconnection and interdependency of computer networks, in 
connection with increased sophistication of cyber attacks over time, demonstrate the need for a 
better understanding of the collective and cooperative security measures needed to prevent and 
respond to cybersecurity emergencies. In 1988, the United States Department of Defense and 
Carnegie Mellon University formed the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) to lead 
and coordinate national and international efforts to combat cybersecurity threats. Since then, the 
development of collective and collaborative cybersecurity has been officially underway for more 
than twenty years and the number of CERTs worldwide has grown dramatically, leading to the 
potential for a sophisticated and coordinated global cybersecurity response network. 
 The Explorations in Cyber International Relations (ECIR) project is a collaborative effort 
involving the MIT Political Science department, the MIT School of Management, the MIT 
Electrical Engineering & Computer Science department, the Harvard Law School, and the 
Harvard Kennedy School of Government. The ECIR Data Dashboard Project is an initiative to 
gather the cybersecurity data publicly provided by the worldwide, but individual, CERTs and 
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provide scholars, policymakers, IT professionals and other stakeholders with a comprehensive 
set of data on nation-level cybersecurity, information technology and demographic data to allow 
analysis and comparisons across countries. The Dashboard allows these stakeholders to observe 
transnational, chronological and multivariate trends and correlations that can lead to insightful 
explanations of the approximate causes and predictions of the potential future trends of global 
cybersecurity issues.  
As a milestone, this paper presents three results that have been achieved so far: (1) it 
summarizes the current state of data from country-specific CERTs, (2) it introduces the ongoing 
Cybersecurity Data Dashboard project which was developed to help these stakeholders track 
potentially critical trends in relevant cybersecurity data, including attacks, threats, vulnerabilities, 
and defenses, etc. along with some sample analyses, and (3) it identifies some shortcomings 
regarding the availability and usability of CERT data and areas for future development. 
Increasing stakeholders’ access to summary and analytical data should significantly enhance the 
efficacy of cybersecurity efforts at all levels, including individual and institutional defense, 
corporate and national policymaking, and high-level coordination and cooperation. The 
flexibility of the Data Dashboard is especially important in ECIR since it is a research 
experiment in interdisciplinary discourse and interaction and the different disciplines have 
different stakes in this Dashboard and the security issues. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief history, 
summary, and analysis of national-level CERT activities and their publicly available 
cybersecurity data. Section 3 introduces the ECIR Data Dashboard prototype and illustrates some 
analyses. Section 4 identifies some of the challenges that we have experienced during the 
investigation and development. Section 5 presents a number of related works and finally, section 
6 concludes the paper. 
2. Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) 
2.1 History and Purpose of CERTs 
The first CERT, at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), was launched in 1988 (Kimberland 
2003) as a response to the Morris Worm (Orman 2003) attack which took down perhaps 10% of 
the Internet during November, 1988. The CMU CERT, during the 1990s, began to help other 
countries develop their own CERTs and maintains to this day a formal Computer Security 
Incident Response Team (CSIRT) development program, including for the United States. The 
CMU CERT is now officially known as the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC)1, as many 
other response teams have chosen the name CERT (where others have chosen CSIRT). 
CERT/CC is the ordination hub for all global CERTs and is responsible for setting standards, best 
practices, and policies. Although the available statistics are not as detailed as nation-level CERTs, 
they are highly aggregated and serve as a useful indicator of global CERT effectiveness. 
CERT/CC works closely with US-CERT (Kimberland 2003), the latter of which is an indirect 
branch of the Department of Homeland Security. 
                                                        
1 http://www.cert.org/ 
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The CERT mandate is to develop and promote best management practices and technology 
applications to “resist attacks on networked systems, to limit damage, and to ensure continuity of 
critical services” (Software Engineering Institute 2008). CERT/CC works in the following fields 
which provide a guideline for the work of other national CERTs and CSIRTs around the world: 
• Software Awareness: Searches for, receives, analyzes, and reports major software 
security vulnerabilities and malicious code. Publishes advice on responses to 
vulnerabilities and threats, and helps create software more secure to attack. 
• Secure Systems: Engineering of networks that have high situational awareness and 
high response speed to deal with coordinated attacks. Goal is to create networks that 
can survive attack and continue functioning. 
• Organizational Security: Encourages and helps develop implementation of proper 
security management and software in individual organizations, and advocates 
government policy that increases security of national, corporate, and private systems. 
• Coordinated Response: Helps create and train response teams for different 
organizations, governments, and companies, including the Department of Homeland 
Security (US-CERT), and the National Computer Security Incident Response Team 
(CSIRT) of Qatar. 
• Education and Training: Provides public training seminars, certification 
training/testing, as well as collegiate degrees at CMU. 
The interconnected nature of modern computer networking assures that major failures in the 
security of a single institution have the potential to create larger damage to other institutions, or 
even large portions of the Internet. To solve the collective action problem, CERTs were designed 
with decentralization and coordination in mind. Ideally, the national CERTs would overlook and 
coordinate an array of CERTs at various levels below, such as industry sectors and individual 
companies. These lower level CERTs would work with each other under the auspices of the 
national CERT in order to offer both robust prevention and monitoring capability and a 
decentralized, distributed response to emergencies and attacks that may arise. This ideal 
configuration would lead to an efficient coordination between organizations ranging from 
semi-government, non-profit to private/corporate to ensure both collective and individual 
security. 
2.2 Current Status and Breadth 
In reality, the CERT security structure remains in its infancy in most countries that do have 
national CERTs, and the ideal CERT network (as explained above) is not even fully developed in 
the CERT’s origin nation, the United States. Many countries do not have CERTs, but significant 
progress has been made over the past two decades in increasing the population of national 
CERTs and other CERT institutions, especially in countries with a large Internet user population 
or Internet-centric economy. 
While there is no single authoritative and centralized list of national CERT programs, Table 
1 lists the 54 countries that the authors have found2. There are certainly other countries with 
                                                        
2 These countries are found from http://www.first.org/about/organization/teams/ and 
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some sort of cybersecurity teams, but the CERTs listed are more specifically national-level, 
cooperative, educating, and responsive organizations.  
Most large enterprises, both local and global organizations, have dedicated IT security teams, 
some of which are called CSIRTs or even CERTs (but many of which are not). These 
enterprise-level cybersecurity teams are often used for solicited surveys from the CERTs for 
collecting incident information and are the points of contact for dissemination of best practices 
and threat alerts. 
Table 1. Countries with National CERTs 
Argentina Australia Austria Bangladesh Brazil Brunei 
Canada Chile China (PRC) Croatia Czech Republic Denmark 
Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hong Kong 
Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Ireland Israel 
Italy Japan Latvia Lithuania Malaysia Mexico 
Myanmar Norway Pakistan Philippines Poland Portugal 
Qatar South Korea Russia Singapore Slovenia Spain 
Sri Lanka Sweden Switzerland Taiwan (ROC) Thailand Tunisia 
Turkey UAE United Kingdom United States Uruguay Vietnam 
2.3 General Data Availability from CERTs 
Many of the national CERTs collect information on a number of cybersecurity issues in their 
countries by year, quarter, or month. Information collection, in general, is conducted by surveys: 
organizations voluntarily (although often by solicitation) disclose attack types, defenses, and 
shortcomings within the organization. In addition, some CERTs have performed data collection 
through passive probes in their national networks. CERTs often aggregate the data to present 
nationwide reports on the state of cybersecurity during the reporting period and trends over time. 
Some CERTs also ask institutions about their defense and security technology, as well as request 
self-criticisms by institutions of their security readiness for different types of attacks, and 
policies, and standards, etc.  
The aggregated survey method has some interesting methodological artifacts that are worth 
noting. They are best illustrated by two examples: first, if a single virus hits 1000 institutions 
(and they all report), then that virus is counted 1000 times; second, if 1000 different viruses hit a 
single enterprise, an “incident” reporting method will lead to 1000 hits, while a “respondent” 
method will report only one hit, as a “respondent” method simply asks whether the respondent 
has experienced that specific problem (i.e., a virus attack) in the reporting period. 
While each CERT is usually consistent between reporting periods3, data consistency between 
CERTs is limited. CERTs have no standardized typology of data: their surveys ask different 
questions and create different categories of attacks and vulnerabilities. CERTs lack a consistent 
data presentation method: some present data in absolute numbers of reports, and others in 
percentages only. Term definition across CERTs is also sometimes inconsistent or unclear. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
http://www.apcert.org/about/structure/members.html.  
3 Though definitions and collections techniques can change over time. 
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Although comparison and international aggregation can be difficult, there are a number of types 
of data that are commonly reported, in some form. 
2.4 US-CERT 
The United States national CERT (US-CERT)4 is affiliated with the Department of 
Homeland Security, and is a distinctly different entity from CERT/CC at CMU. These two largest 
US CERTs share information and in case of a large-scale attack, will often coordinate extensively 
in leading a response. US-CERT is charged with providing response support and defense against 
cyber attacks for the Federal Civil Executive Branch and information sharing and collaboration 
with the state and local government, industry and international partners. 
US-CERT provides the most comprehensive and detailed definition of terms, as explained: 
“A computer incident within US-CERT is, as defined by NIST Special Publication 800-61 
(Grance et al. 2004), a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, 
acceptable use policies, or standard computer security practices.” There are six categories 
regarding computer incidents used by US-CERT. 
• CAT 1 – Unauthorized Access: An individual gains logical or physical access without 
permission to a federal agency network, system, application, data, or other resource. 
• CAT 2 – Denial of Service (DoS): An explicit attempt by attackers to prevent 
legitimate users of a service from using that service. 
• CAT 3 – Malicious Code: Successful installation of malicious software (e.g., virus, 
worm, spyware, bot, Trojan horse, or other code-based malicious entity that infects 
or affects an operating system or application).  
• CAT 4 – Improper Usage: Violation of acceptable usage policies as established by 
the organization. 
• CAT 5 – Scans, Probes, or Attempted Access: any activity that seeks to access or 
identify a federal agency computer, open ports, protocols, services, or any 
combination for later exploit. This activity does not directly result in a compromise 
or denial of service.  
• CAT 6 – Investigation: Unconfirmed incidents of potential malicious or anomalous 
activity deemed by the reporting entity to warrant further review. 
The above definitions of the categories of computer incidents are not shared universally by 
other CERTs, but certainly provide a relatively authoritative guide to what statistical data 
represents. 
 As an example, Figure 1 presents two charts regarding the computer incidents reported by 
US-CERT during the fourth quarter of 2008 (2008 Q4) (US-CERT 2008). Figure 1(a) breaks 
down the reported incidents by official US-CERT category. As can be seen, the greatest threat is 
“Scans, Probes & Attempted Access”. Thus, the vast majority of threats reported to US-CERT 
are related to attempts to deceive the user (including phishing and malicious website), rather than 
direct attacks against the defenses of the computer or the network. Figure 1(b) is a breakdown of 
the top five incidents and events versus all others. The top incident type reported to US-CERT 
                                                        
4 http://www.us-cert.gov/ 
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was phishing, accounting for 71.8% of all incidents reported. Comparing the two charts, it could 
be concluded that phishing makes up the vast majority of the “Scans, Probes & Attempted 
Access” attacks (at about 77% of all incidents). 
    
    
         (a) Incidents by Category                       (b) Top 5 incidents 
               Figure 1. Chart Examples of US-CERT Incidents in 2008 Q4 
3. ECIR Data Dashboard Prototype 
3.1 Purpose 
The ECIR Data Dashboard is developed to provide historical trend data as well as current 
statistics and news to policymakers, academics, IT professionals and other stakeholders. By 
consulting the Dashboard, the user can compare trends in national-level cybersecurity threats and 
vulnerabilities among several countries and/or regions. Also, the user can use the Dashboard to 
compare these trends against other relevant national-level statistics to find patterns and 
correlations. To this extent, the Dashboard provides data in three categories: 
• Demographic Data: Basic data about a country’s population, economy, education 
level, and other attributes that may affect the development of the country’s Internet 
services or IT security sectors. (Sources: World Development Indicators Database) 
• IT Data: Data outlining the state of the country’s IT infrastructure, usage, and 
security, including Internet bandwidth, users, services, etc. (Sources: ITU, World 
Development Indicators, CIA World Factbook) 
• Cybersecurity Data: Data provided largely by national CERTs that reflect 
chronological trends of threat/vulnerability statistics. 
The Dashboard allows the user to select any number of countries (and/or regions) with 
which to compare the data. The X-axis measurement is time (currently year), any of the data 
mentioned above can be selected for the Y-axis, allowing the user to compare correlations in 
multiple strands of data, each of which is for one country or region. Also, the Dashboard allows 
the user to divide one strand of data into another. This allows the user to compare the data in new 
ways. For example: dividing population into any measurement creates a “per capita” 
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measurement. Likewise, the user can compare the viruses reported per number of Internet users. 
Additionally, the user can select to graph the data on a linear or logarithmic scale, which can be 
very helpful in studying trends when comparing data, say from a large country with that of a 
small country (the small country data might appear as a straight line at zero on a linear scale). 
The Dashboard thus provides the user with a great amount of flexibility and power in finding 
exactly what data to compare, how to compare it, and how to illustrate it, so that multinational 
cybersecurity data can be deeply and robustly investigated. 
3.2 Development 
The Dashboard technology has been developed in three primary parts: Web user interface, 
database system, and recent news headlines, each of which is introduced as follows. 
3.2.1 Web User Interface 
The user interface is a Web application designed to query the database and creates charts of 
information on-the-fly. The user interface is implemented using the JavaServer Pages (JSP) 
Technology and Java programming. It provides a number of fields from which the user can select 
the countries/regions of interest, the X-axis variable (i.e., start year and end year for the 
observation), and the Y-axis variable (i.e., measurement data to observe) as well as the graphing 
type (linear or logarithmic). After the Show Chart button sends the request, the Dashboard 
application reads the requested data from the back-end database and draws the charts by 
automatically scaling the axis to reflect a “best fit” view of the data. The drawing feature is 
implemented by the JFreeChart (Gilbert and Morgner 2009), a set of Java APIs. 
 
Figure 2. Example Request to Generate Chart of # Personal Computers per Capita 
Figure 2 is a screenshot of the Dashboard configuration. As shown in Figure 2, a number of 
countries are listed in the left side. In the selection list, the countries are grouped into 
corresponding hierarchical regions. From the list, the user can select several countries (and/or 
regions) of interest. By selecting the start year and end year, the user can set the observation 
period. The Dashboard currently incorporates data from the chronological range from 2000 to 
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2008. In the right side, the user can select one or two attributes (i.e., measurement data). In case 
of two attributes, the user should also select an operator by which the data of interest can be 
calculated from them, such as the Division operator by which Attribute 1 is divided by Attribute 
2 to be observed. The user can also set the Y-axis to a linear or logarithmic scale, which is 
particularly helpful when comparing data stands that different considerably in values, such as 
comparing large and small countries, as illustrated later. For example, Figure 2 is a request to 
display the number of PC per capita of three countries (China, Croatia, and Estonia) from 2000 
and 2004. 
 
Figure 3. Generated Chart of # Personal Computers per Capita 
Figure 3 is the resulting screenshot from the Dashboard. For convenience and added 
precision, the actual data from the database is displayed in the table below the chart.  
3.2.2 Database System 
The back-end database of the Dashboard is the Palo MOLAP database (Raue et al. 2009). 
MOLAP stands for “Multidimensional On-Line Analytical Processing” which is an approach to 
quickly answer multidimensional analytical queries (Thomsen 2002). The Palo database uses a 
multidimensional data model (Pedersen and Jensen 1999), allowing multidimensional structures 
to organize data and express the relationships between the data. These structures are broken into 
cubes; the cubes are able to store and access data within the confines of each cube. Each cell 
within a multidimensional structure contains aggregated data related to elements along each of 
its dimensions. The output of a MOLAP query is displayed in a matrix format in which the 
dimensions form the rows and columns, and the relevant measurements form the data values. By 
using a MOLAP database, the Dashboard can quickly answer queries of any aggregated data, 
such as regional data. Palo consists of a mature MOLAP database server and an Excel add-in. 
Furthermore, JPalo5 provides a set of Java API to manipulate the Palo database. These features 
make it an excellent choice as the back-end database of the Data Dashboard project. 
In the current stage, there exists one cube with three dimensions in the Palo MOLAP 
                                                        
5 http://www.jpalo.com/ 
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database. The three dimensions are “Countries”, “Years” and “Attributes”. When the countries 
(and/or regions), years for the observation, and one or two attributes are determined, the 
corresponding measurement data can be accessed. 
3.2.3 Recent News Headlines 
To help the user to be informed of recent developments, the Dashboard also lists a number of 
high-relevance recent news headlines by using the MIT-developed Cameleon software [Madnick 
et al. 2000] which is a Web extraction engine designed to automatically extract data of interest 
from semi-structured documents (e.g., Web pages). In this example, the recent news articles 
listed by the Dashboard using the search terms “cyber security OR computer spam OR 
cyber” in Google News. The Dashboard displays the up-to-date news story snippets at the 
bottom of the user interface page, with hyperlinks that allow the user to open the full story in a 
new window or tab on their browser. For example, Figure 4 shows the recent news headlines 
listed by the Dashboard on July 17, 2009. 
 
Figure 4. Dashboard Recent News Headlines (on July 17, 2009) 
3.3 Current Status of Dashboard Prototype 
The current status as of August 7, 2009, includes a working prototype of the Dashboard. 
Table 2 presents the current variables available in the Dashboard prototype. The countries 
available in the current Dashboard are: United States, China, India, Germany, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Brazil, Estonia, Latvia, Croatia, Malaysia, and Australia. The current cybersecurity data 
availability of each category, by country, is presented in Table 3. In Table 3, “Prop.” represents a 
source hosting proportional data; “Abs.” represents absolute numerical data; “None” represents 
no data. Most data threads are not available for all the years of the Dashboard (2000 – 2008); 
many CERTs have only published quantitative data in the past few years; many have not yet 
released 2008 data. These represent some of the data challenges in performing multi-country 
cybersecurity analysis as discussed in more detail in a later section of this paper. 
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Table 2. Variables in the Data Dashboard 
Demographic Data IT Data Cybersecurity Data 
Population (#) Internet User (#) Total incidents (#) 
Gross Domestic Product (USD) International Bandwidth (MBps) Phishing (#) 
Software Piracy Losses (USD) Personal Computers (#) Trojan/worm/malware (#) 
Energy Consumption (KWh/yr) Hosts (#) DoS (#) 
Total Education Enrollment (%) Secure Servers (#) Spam (#) 
The current database has some gaps in cross-time or cross-national CERT coverage. In the 
next phase, more extensive types of data and better sources of data are being sought. Also, both 
the number of countries and the categories of data will be significantly expanded in future 
versions of the Dashboard prototype. In spite of these shortcomings, there is sufficient CERT 
data available to perform some interesting initial analyses. 
 
Table 3. Availability of CERT-based Cybersecurity Data by Country 
Category USA China India Korea Malaysia Brazil Germany Japan Estonia Croatia Latvia 
Malicious 
Code Prop. Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. Abs. None None Prop. None None 
Phishing Prop. Abs. Abs. None None None None Abs. Prop. None Prop. 
Scanning Prop. Abs. None None None Abs. None Abs. None None None 
Spam None Abs. Abs. None Abs. Abs. None None Prop. None None 
DoS None Abs. None None Abs. Abs. None None None None Prop. 
3.4 Interesting Demonstrations and Observations 
To show the utilization, we provide several interesting examples using the Data Dashboard 
prototype.  
Figure 5 shows a screenshot of the total CERT reported incidents of three countries (China, 
Malaysia, and Brazil) from 2003 to 2008. It can be seen that the number of the total CERT 
reported incidents of Brazil is much greater than that of China and Malaysia in almost of all 
years. Thanks to the logarithmic Y-axis scale for the chart, the data strands of the three countries 
are shown distinctly. If only the linear Y-axis scale could be used, the data strands of China and 
Malaysia would be pushed to the bottom of the chart because of the huge differences. 
Figure 6 is a screenshot of “Virus/worm/malicious code/malware” divided by “Total CERT 
Reported Incidents” of two countries (Malaysia and Brazil) from 2002 to 2008 with logarithmic 
Y-axis scale in the chart. In other words, Figure 6 shows the data strands of the percentage of a 
category of the total reported CERT incidents, in this case, “Virus/worm/malicious 
code/malware”. 
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Figure 5. Total CERT Reported Incidents from 2003 to 2008 (Logarithmic) 
 
Figure 6. Percentage of Virus/worm/malicious code/malware from 2002 to 2008 (Logarithmic) 
Figure 7 illustrates an interesting country comparison. It shows a screenshot of “Total CERT 
Reported Incidents” divided by “Population” (thus creating a per capita measurement) of two 
countries, Malaysia and Brazil, from 2003 to 2007 with a logarithmic Y-axis style in the chart.  
It is interesting that the per capita number of reported incidents started at very different levels (in 
2003) – differing by about two orders of magnitude. But the rate has dropped sharply in Brazil 
while rising sharply in Malaysia such that they are at almost equal rates by 2007. This raises the 
intriguing question: “Why?” One set of hypotheses might be that (a) since Brazil had such a high 
rate in 2003, government and companies made extra efforts to reduce incidents and were 
successful, and (b) since there were so few incidents in Malaysia in 2003, no such efforts were 
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made and, as a result, incidents have been increasing. This just illustrates one possible set of 
hypotheses. A key goal of the ECIR research effort is to identify such interesting situations and to 
drill down deeper into the Dashboard data (as well as other sources of information) to develop 
hypotheses and theories to better understand cyber international relations – both within countries 
and between countries. 
 
Figure 7: Total CERT Reported Incidents per Capita from 2003 to 2007 (Logarithmic) 
It is worth noting that the independent national CERTs only provide the cybersecurity data 
regarding their own countries, but none of them provides extensive comparison data across 
different countries. This is an important contribution achieved using the ECIR Data Dashboard. 
4. Challenges 
A number of challenges and opportunities of using CERT data for discovery and 
improvement remain for the cybersecurity Dashboard project that has been uncovered in our 
efforts. 
4.1 Data Sources and Data Availability 
The data availability varies by category. In particular, it is sometimes difficult to find precise 
definitions of each category of cybersecurity data that are currently used by the CERTs. Although 
CERTs are often the primary sources of such cybersecurity data, many countries do not have 
national CERTs. Also, many national CERTs are new and do not provide much data, if any at all. 
The lack of data availability will continue to be a pressing challenge for exploring the cyber 
international relations. This will be addressed by working closer with the CERTs both to better 
understand their data and to encourage them to increase and improve their data efforts. 
In addition to the CERTs, there are other national and international organizations that also 
collect relevant data – both public sectors (e.g., the FBI in the United States) and private 
organizations (e.g., Symantec, Arbor Networks, Microsoft, and McAfee). The Data Dashboard 
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project will seek cooperation and collaboration with these organizations. 
4.2 Data Consistency and Reliability 
Although many CERTs provide information on national threats and vulnerabilities, data 
consistency is a problem. Many CERTs have only started to record data within the last three or 
four years, leading to limited capacity for historical trend analysis. Furthermore, the lack of 
consistency between CERTs complicates the task of developing a robust framework to analyze 
cybersecurity data. CERTs often do not share categorization methods for threats and 
vulnerabilities, and although some general categories can be constructed successfully, they do 
not apply to all CERTs.  
The surveys used by CERTs to collect data also vary greatly, rendering comparisons between 
countries difficult. For example, numerical comparisons can be misleading if the breadth of a 
survey is not explicitly clear; if both countries survey very different proportions of the population, 
the absolute numerical data will be incomparable. Additionally, even if survey respondents are 
relatively accurate, most respond on behalf of institutions on which disproportionate weights 
may be placed if response rates differ significantly. For example, it is unclear whether an incident 
at a large institution should be weighted the same as an incident at a smaller institution.  
Lastly, most national CERTs are not mandated by federal governments. As a result, national 
CERTs tend to respond to incidents at their own discretion, and only handle a subset of the total 
number of national vulnerabilities and incidents. Thus, reported figures may not be indicative of 
the true volume of national domestic attacks. CERTs are also restricted from handling attacks on 
national defense and intelligence networks, so statistics concerning these types of incidents will 
likely remain unavailable for analysis. 
These data consistency and reliability issues pose a challenge for the ECIR Dashboard 
project and addressing these issues will be a major focus of our future activities.  
5. Related Works 
Cybersecurity data sharing has emerged as an important issue in the recent years. While 
some organizations have regularly disclosed their cybersecurity reports, the reported data is 
usually difficult to be combined or compared because of various data inconsistencies. To 
facilitate the comparison of the cybersecurity data disclosed by different organizations, the 
Security and Networking Research Group at the Sandia National Lab and CERT/CC at CMU 
have developed a “common language” consisting of a set of “high level” terms and taxonomies 
that can be used to classify and understand cyber security incidents (Howard and Longstaff, 
1998).  
Despite the “common language”, existing cybersecurity terms and categories are still diverse 
in both meaning and use. Since a large part of cyber threats and attacks are disseminated via the 
Web, a survey of Web security issues was offered which focused on particular areas of concern, 
such as server security, mobile code, data transfer and user privacy (Rubin and Geer, 1998). As 
can be seen, those Web security issues of particular interest were not classified or explored 
according to the “common language” developed in (Howard and Longstaff, 1998). For cyber 
intrusion detection, data mining techniques are usually applied to detect known instructions and 
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their variations as well as unknown instructions (Dokas et al. 2002). Yet further detection 
techniques need to be developed, so that cyber threats can be identified and detected in terms of a 
“common” taxonomy. 
On the other hand, there still exist a large number of organizations that haven’t initiated 
cybersecurity data-sharing actions. Partially this is because those organizations haven’t realized 
the importance of cybersecurity data sharing. Thus, it is necessary to identify economic 
incentives to encourage the desired data sharing (Dacey 2003). Focusing on private organizations 
(e.g., firms, sectors), the work of (Gal-Or and Ghose, 2003) identified a number of economic 
incentives of sharing cybersecurity data within industry-based Information Sharing and Analysis 
Centers (ISACs). In particular, an analytical framework was developed to investigate the 
competitive implications of sharing cybersecurity data and investments in cybersecurity 
technologies.  
Although the related research described above represent important efforts in understanding 
and improving cybersecurity data, they do not directly overlap with the unique contributions of 
this paper which are to: (1) use country-specific CERT data to develop a global database to 
compare trends across countries, (2) describe software to support the necessary analysis and 
discuss some interesting results, and (3) identify strengths and weaknesses of CERT data. 
6. Conclusion 
With the increasing global interconnection of computer networks and sophistication of cyber 
attacks, the need for collective and cooperative cybersecurity measures have been drawing more 
attention, so that cybersecurity emergencies can be prevented or efficiently responded. This 
paper first introduces the various CERT-type organizations that produce quantitative and 
qualitative cybersecurity data. Although much information is freely shared and non-confidential, 
few organizations provide standardized or reliable metrics and where data exists, it is rarely 
aggregated. This paper introduces the ECIR Data Dashboard Project which is developed to 
gather the cybersecurity data that are publicly provided by national/international CERTs and 
provide stakeholders with a comprehensive set of data on nation-level cybersecurity, IT 
characteristics and demographics. We then present the current state of the data availability of the 
national CERTs and their limitations. In spite of the identified shortcomings of the CERT data, it 
is possible to learn and identify interesting trends using the Data Dashboard.  
In the future, more data sources will be identified and incorporated to increase the 
effectiveness of the Dashboard project, so that further interesting international cybersecurity 
relations can be investigated. Also, existing and advanced techniques, such as the utilization of 
semantic integration technologies, will be applied to address and improve the data inconsistency 
problems among different national CERTs. Furthermore, it may be necessary to explore the 
economic or social incentives of sharing the nation-level cybersecurity data among the national 
and international organizations (e.g., CERTs) as well as the data of other organizations, both 
public and private, that gather relevant cybersecurity data. 
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